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The science of  the COAG Coordinated Care Trials
Peter W. Harvey1 and Peter J. McDonald2
Sharing Health Care SA, University of  South Australia1,
Flinders Institute for Health Research, Flinders University2
Objectives: To explicate the organisational change agenda of  the COAG coordinated care trials
within the Australian health system and to illuminate the role of  science in this process.
Methods and Results: This article briefly outlines the COAG coordinated care trial aims and the
effect of  the trial as a change initiative in rural South Australia.   It is proposed that although
the formal trial outcomes are still not clear, the trial had significant impact upon health service
delivery in some sites.  The trial involved standard research methods with control and intervention
groups and with key hypotheses being tested to compare the costs and service utilization profile
of  intervention and control groups.  Formal results indicate that costs were not significantly
different between intervention and control groups across all sites, but that the trial, nonetheless,
had a powerful impact on the attitude and behaviours of  service providers in the rural trial on
Eyre Peninsula in particular.  Some of  the key structural changes now in place are outlined.
Conclusions: The COAG trial has had many and varied impacts upon those organisations and
individual providers involved with it.  It is argued here that since successive initiatives had
been implemented before final evaluation results were published, other agendas were served by
the trial apart from those of  standard scientific research and hypothesis testing.  That is, the
main impact of  the coordinated care trial in Eyre Region at least has been change by stealth,
and not through scientific research and demonstration.
Implications:  The COAG trials have set in train a series of  structural and procedural changes
in the methods of  delivery and management of  primary health care systems; changes that are
embodied in the Enhanced Primary Care packages (EPC) and other initiatives recently
introduced by the Commonwealth Government.  These changes have occurred and are occurring
across the system without formal evidence as to their efficacy, suggesting that other financial
motives are driving these new approaches apart from the goal of  improving health outcomes for
consumers.  Also, if  science is to be used in this way to drive policy and procedural change
ahead of  actual outcome evidence, it is important that we examine the more subtle agendas of
such research projects in future if  the integrity of  the scientific method is to be maintained.  The
occurrence of  such phenomena questions the very foundation of  scientific endeavour and
weakens the application of  scientific principles in the arena of  social and political science.
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The COAG trials were established to test the
principal hypothesis that improved coordination
of  services for patients with chronic conditions
could improve health outcomes for that population
within existing resources (COAG principal
hypothesis).  The concept of “coordination” also
carried an implication of  fund streamlining; the
alignment of  all major government funding streams
associated with certain patient groups
(Commonwealth of  Australia, 1999a, p144; Podger,
1999) for management within new operational
structures such as those modelled by the Regional
Demonstration Unit (RDU) concept initiated by SA
HealthPlus.  The SA HealthPlus trial, for example,
stated its primary hypothesis as:
Coordination of  car e for people with multiple
ser vice needs, wher e car e is assessed through
individual care plans and funds ar e pooled from
existing Commonwealth, State and joint programmes,
will r esult in improved individual patient health and
well being within existing r esour ce. (Commonwealth
of Australia, 1999a)
In the Eyre Peninsula, coordinated care trials
around 1350 intervention patients with chronic and
complex conditions and 500 matched control
patients were enrolled. The Eyre RDU was
established to manage the government health
service resources normally allocated to those
enrolled patients, and to deliver a more coordinated
and integrated package of essential services
designed to prevent hospital admissions and other
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health-related crises.  The RDU employed
registered nurses, in the main, as local service
coordinators to support defined groups of  patients,
funded best practice service provision through GP
surgeries, and organised rehabilitation and
education programs for patients.
Principally, the trial managers postulated that
by tracking all costs and health service utilisation
of  the intervention group against a matched control
group, it would be possible to determine the extent
to which health crises, and hence health
expenditure, could be reduced through improved
coordination and more detailed service
management.  A financial value was placed upon
“saved admissions” and prevented “health crises”,
which, if  all resources were pooled for the enrolled
cohort, could amount to savings sufficient at least
to fund the extra coordination and service provision
required to manage chronically ill patients better.
Improved primary care, it was conjectured in
the trial hypotheses, might also reduce the growth
in demand in the acute sector by preventing
progression of  complications in relation to chronic
illness and result in improved quality of  life for
consumers of health services.  This would enable
a much more efficient use of  national resources
than would the building of new hospitals to meet
burgeoning and unchecked growth in acute
demand, much of which is deemed to be avoidable
if  programs could be established to support
preventive approaches to population health care.
Others, however, argue (Bindman, 1995;
Callahan, 1998, p98; Chernow, Hirth, Seema,
Ernann, & Fendrick, 1998; Katz, Mazhari, Kalus, &
Nawaz, 1999; Leutz, 1999, p89; Weinberger,
Oddone, & Henderson, 1996) that such savings
and efficiencies are short-term phenomena unable
to deliver sustainable cost reductions, and that it
was by no means clear that such interventions
could be both beneficial to patients as well as of
financial value to the health system generally.  The
success of  such ventures also depended upon
extraordinary levels of cooperation between
hitherto separate and often competing interests
within the health care system.
GPs, understandably, were sceptical about the
COAG trials when they were introduced.  They
saw the proposed model as being indicative of  an
inexorable drift towards managed care, fund-
holding and GP-based risk management, all of
which could result in changes to the working
conditions of GPs and to their potential incomes
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1999b, p50); the end
of  the world as we have known it!  Most therefore
only became involved peripherally in the trials on
the understanding that their income would not be
reduced as a result of  their participation.  The same
sentiment pervades current and tentative
endeavours by Divisions of General Practice to
become partial fund-holders of  primary care
resources because the AMA remains “vigorously
opposed to any notion of fund-holding” (Australian
Doctor, 2001).  Also, there is ideological opposition
from some health professionals to more recent
chronic illness self-management ventures
sponsored by the Commonwealth Government and
this trend has been reported in other countries
(Heidelberg, 2002).
With the advent of  the new Enhanced Primary
Care (EPC) packages and Medical Benefits Schedule
(MBS) health assessment and care planning options
for GPs, the Commonwealth has implemented
further reforms across the health system.  It offered
new funds for planned and coordinated GP services
even before the evaluation reports from the first
trials were finalised.  Clearly this “up front” funding
for health assessments and care planning, which
is modelled on the Coordinated Care Trials, is being
offered in the belief  that such approaches to care
will ultimately reduce demand for other MBS item
services and change the pattern of  GP service
provision.
This assumes that the MBS pool for GP services
overall will not increase, although this may not be
the case in rural communities where GPs could
shift activity to primary health teams and still
maintain routine MBS services because of  current
levels of un-met demand for GP services.  This
appears to be a strategy for altering the conditions
of payment to GPs for primary services and
introducing much more prescriptive structures for
the provision of  those services.  At the same time,
however, this strategy could also exert pressure
on the state-funded primary care system to provide
additional services through collaboration with GPs
to meet new care plan framework demands.  The
care planning processes will also increase pressure
on state-funded community and allied health
services to provide more primary care services and
programs as detailed on patient care plans.   The
question remains though, who will pay the
additional costs associated with change and in
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whose interests is this change to function?  In the
final analysis, is the change worth the investment
(Frenkel, 1999, p166)?
In addition, these developments also exert
pressure upon the state-funded acute sector to shift
resources from this area in the belief  that improved
primary care services provided in partnership with
GPs will reduce demand for hospital services.  In
accepting the conditions of the new EPC packages
and the next Coordinated Care Trials, GPs and state-
funded primary care services are accepting an as
yet unproven hypothesis that not only is
Coordinated Care a good method for improving
health outcomes, but that it is sustainable and
affordable.  It being affordable is contingent upon
the state being able to shift resources from the
acute sector permanently to the primary care sector
by reducing the rate of  increase in demand for
and cost of hospital services.  If this cannot be
achieved, we will be faced with sustaining current
per capita expenditure in the acute sector at the
same time as increasing primary care funding; a
situation that can only increase total health sector
spending, not reduce or bring stability to it.
Alternatively, the state will need to find new
and additional resources to fund the improved and
more coordinated primary care systems being
encouraged by Commonwealth investment in early
intervention and prevention.  This does not imply
an absolute and immediate reduction in acute
services, but rather a gradual shift in emphasis over
time away from the currently expanding acute care
sector demand and towards primary intervention.
It is postulated that coordinated care could result
in a flattening of the gradient of acute sector
demand and spending, and enable an increase in
the gradient of  primary care provision while the
overall spending growth remains quite stable.
However, as demonstrated by the SA HealthPlus
trials in South Australia, there are many and varied
forces at play in the current climate to prevent
such substitution of  resources.  The task is not an
easy one, although SA HealthPlus has demonstrated
that it is possible to moderate demand in a sample
population while maintaining health outcomes
(Centre for Health Care Evaluation [CHCE], 2000).
If  the sample population were to be increased
significantly, a relative reduction in demand might
be achieved in hospitals, based on an increase in
primary care activity to sustain lowered rates of
acute demand.  In such a situation, economies of
scale within hospitals, together with the avoidance
of  “backfilling” of  hospital beds through other
demand, might ensure that hospital outcomes could
be maintained without the need for increased
resource allocations to this sector.
Similar trends have been noted in other
countries, as the demand for hospital services
appears to be outstripping the ability of
governments to fund this demand.  Assuming that
Australia, like the New Zealand or the Czech
republic, for example, (Krupinski, 1999, p15) will
support only moderate growth in the private sector
insurance system to take up this increasing demand,
strategies will need to be developed to manage
acute sector demand.
The participation of GPs and health units in the
Coordinated Care process has led, progressively,
to an increasing demand for primary care and allied
health services.  It may also lead to a further shifting
of  funding responsibility from the Commonwealth
to the states for health care generally as GPs seek
substituted funding directly from health units to
subsidise and support their hitherto MBS-funded
activity.  A similar impact may also be felt in the
private health sector where the direct cost of  GP
services will increase if  the Commonwealth is able
to convince more Australians to insure privately
for such services or to offer gap insurance with
the introduction of  new item numbers.
However, these strategies for change are running
ahead and independent of  the evidence from the
formal trials, suggesting again that the trials were
not really about testing new processes scientifically,
but rather about introducing new policies in the
guise of  science.   The agenda appears to be more
about change by stealth than about scientific
demonstration and logical development of  more
effective processes for managing care and
improving health outcomes (Harvey, 2001).
There is little doubt that the trials are an effective
strategy for creating a culture of  change, but as
Leutz (1999) notes, this change culture costs money
before it returns benefits, if  indeed it ever does so.
Given that new coordinated care initiatives
proceeded even before the final evaluation of  the
initial round of  trials was completed, and accepting
that the new EPC packages may result in the burden
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of this coordination being carried by GPs and state
health units, what might be concluded about the
aim of the COAG trials?
This recent chain of  events in the
implementation of  coordinated care type initiatives
without adequate scientific evaluation and
verification suggests that the agenda for change
has been set more by political and economic
imperatives than by demonstrated health outcomes.
That is, one component of  the coordinated care
thesis has driven these changes; that component
that speaks of  “no additional cost” while the other,
the improved health outcome component, has been
less important in the equation.
It appears that scientific method and analysis
has been used as a Trojan horse to enter under
the guard of  health professionals and to promote
the single agenda of  introducing new management
and funding structures to cap, manage or reduce
the overall cost of  per capita health care services.
The science being done in the guise of  a formal
trial has enabled a range of new funding and
service management processes to establish a
foothold in the fabric of the health system as “best
practice” even before the efficacy of  this practice
has been demonstrated.
New coordinated care processes may well result
in better management of  chronic illness and
improved health outcomes for consumers, but this
is yet to be conclusively demonstrated in the
Australian context.  Certainly Chronic Disease Self
Management (CDSM) programs, based on the work
of Lorig and Fries and which followed the first
round of  coordinated care trials, have been shown
in the US to improve patient quality of  life and
reduce service utilisation (Fries et al., 1993; Fries,
2000; Fries et al., 1994; Fries, 1997; Lorig, Mazonson,
& Holman, 1993; Lorig et al., 1999).  Evolving work
in Australia may continue this trend and lead to
improved accountability for outcomes across the
system, but to date many systems changes in
Australia have simply been introduced by stealth,
not through replicable scientific process.
Resource substitution may now have a more
“outcome focus” and be designed to achieve
improved health outcomes, but we need to quantify
and validate the actual impact of these new
structures.  If  the public sector is going to manage
health funds as a whole, waste or inefficiency cannot
be allowed to constrain the capacity of the whole
system to achieve desired population health
outcomes.  We do need, however, much more
evidence of the actual impact that these new
management strategies are having on population
health outcomes and patterns of  health service
provision in order to determine which approaches
are most effective and therefore most likely to be
sustainable.
In this evolving system, however, is the
wellbeing of  patients a high priority?  Will this
government-controlled demand management,
which is ultimately aimed at rationalising resources
for the public good, achieve better outcomes for
all concerned?  Ultimately, we need to know
objectively if  there is really any substantial evidence
that the new management mechanisms being
implemented actually produce improved health
outcomes for patients, as well as business and
financial outcomes for funders and providers of
health services.
Finally, this recent series of  events prompts
important questions about the independence of
science in the processes of  leading and testing new
initiatives that may ultimately change the way we
live and work.  Is science the handmaiden of social
and political change or is it an independent arbiter
in the change process?  If  science is to be used as
a tool to introduce change, as appears to be the
case in the COAG venture, this process may
threaten the very premises of  scientific endeavour
(Popper, 1969) and weaken its application to the
tasks of  social and political reform in Australia.
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